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2 February 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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2 February 1963

### DAILY BRIEF

\*USSR: (The Soviet move terminating the New York phase of the nuclear test talks with the US and Britain probably reflects Khrushchev's belief that these talks have served their purpose of focusing world attention on his "concession" in accepting once again the principle of on-site inspections.)

(By transferring the talks to the 18-nation Geneva disarmament conference, he hopes to gain a more advantageous forum for generating pressure for a further reduction in US requirements for a test-ban agreement.)

(In the final session on 31 January, the Soviet representatives contended that the USSR had done everything to make a speedy agreement possible and charged that the talks had shown that the US has no desire to end testing. They concluded that in the light of this impasse, the USSR was compelled to interrupt the talks and transfer them to Geneva.)

(Khrushchev's main purpose in agreeing to two or three on-site inspections a year probably was to improve the post-Cuba international atmosphere and reopen meaningful negotiations with the US. The interruption of the test talks, however, signals a shift in Soviet tactics which apparently will now be))

aimed primarily at capitalizing on the disarray in the Western alliance following President de Gaulle's 14 January statement. This shift was also reflected in Gromyko's insistence on 21 January that France must participate in a test-ban treaty.)

(It is likely that the Soviet leaders will withhold any further substantive moves on a test ban until they have time to assess the impact of De Gaulle's stand on Western positions on other major issues such as Berlin and Germany.)

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
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Congo: (Steps toward the demobilization and integration of the Katangan armed forces are scheduled to begin next week.)

(Under present plans, Katangan soldiers who by 5 February have indicated a desire to join the Congo Army would be accepted without reprisal. After that date, joint UN-Congo army teams now being established would register other troops and honorably discharge them. Those not registering would face prosecution.)

(Leopoldville reportedly does not intend, however, to accept more than 6,000-7,000 carefully screened Katangan soldiers, about one third of present Katangan strength.)

(Despite these plans, Tshombé has indicated that his officers and troops would need stronger guarantees of personal safety before they would turn themselves in. He said he had arranged with the UN for his officers to go to Leopoldville on 1 and 2 February to take an oath of allegiance, but that his army commander, fearing arrest, preferred to resign.) 25X1

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**\*Dominican Republic:** The draft of a new constitution for the Dominican Republic has caused unrest among propertied classes and has alarmed important members of the interim government.

The constituent assembly, which convened on 25 January to rewrite the constitution that served the Trujillo regime, is dominated by President-elect Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). The draft contains articles discouraging foreign investors. It also asserts labor's right to participate in business profits, permits the state to "collectivize" and expropriate private property without prior indemnification, and prohibits corporations from owning land.

President Bonnelly termed the draft a "Communist" constitution, a view shared by Antonio Imbert, a member of the seven-man ruling Council of State. Bonnelly, who hopes to prevent any disturbances during the period before Bosch's inauguration scheduled for 27 February, stated that unidentified agitators already are touring the country trying to capitalize on discontent caused by the proposals.

Bosch, who is now in Europe trying to line up private capital to support his plans for developing the country, presumably will cause the articles affecting foreign investment to be removed or modified when he returns to Santo Domingo, probably within a week or so.

Meanwhile, Imbert, who has plotted almost continuously to gain power for himself during the past year, may attempt to exacerbate the situation in order to prevent the inauguration, perhaps with the help of disgruntled members of the former oligarchy and members of the extreme left.

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NOTE

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Iran: (The Shah has decided that the National Front, the only major political opposition group in Iran, must be "crushed" because it opposed the recent national referendum. Although he has claimed publicly that the Front is "100 percent" more dangerous than the Communists, it is in actuality a loosely organized array of nationalists, neutralists, and advocates of reform on their own terms. A police campaign against the Front would probably tend to consolidate these elements.)

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